Abstract-We prove a tight lower bound on the communication complexity of secure multicast key distribution protocols in which rekey messages are built using symmetric-key encryption, pseudorandom generators, and secret sharing schemes. Our lower bound shows that the amortized cost of updating the group key for each group membership change (as a function of the current group size) is at least log 2 ( 
I. INTRODUCTION
E NSURING privacy of communication over broadcast channels is a security task of considerable practical importance. At a high level, the problem involves a source of information (say, a PayTV broadcast station), which wants to transmit data privately to a privileged subset of users of a broadcast channel (say, the subscribers to the PayTV service), while ensuring that users outside this privileged group cannot decipher what is being sent. Furthermore, membership of the privileged group changes dynamically (in an arbitrary a priori unknown manner) and the source desires to keep its data hidden from unprivileged recipients at each point in time. The challenge lies in devising secure solutions for this problem in such a way that the communication and storage overhead is minimized.
Two distinct models have been used in the literature to study this problem. The first, commonly referred to as broadcast encryption [13] , assumes that all receivers are stateless, and so current data must be decipherable independently of past transmissions. This model has the advantage that it does not require users to be "attentive" to all broadcasts in order to be able to decipher the material sent at a fixed instant. However, the advantage comes at a price: solutions to broadcast encryption are often quite intensive, either in terms of user storage and computation requirements or in terms of communication complexity. The second model, studied under the title of multicast key distribution or multicast encryption [36] , [35] , is more general in that it allows users to maintain state and use previously learned keys for decrypting current transmissions. This model is better suited to multicast-based applications on the Internet (like online gaming and Internet-based pay-per-view services) where users are stateful, and, more importantly, conserving bandwidth is an important design goal. In this paper, our focus is on multicast key distribution protocols and, specifically, those that are designed using efficient symmetric-key cryptographic techniques. Quite commonly, key distribution in multicast is implemented using a central distribution authority, called the group center, responsible for establishing a shared key among all privileged group members and for "rekeying" the group (that is, changing the shared key) every time a new member joins and/or an existing member leaves the group. The shared key can subsequently be used for various purposes, and, in particular, it can be used to guarantee privacy of group data (by encrypting all such data under the said key using a symmetric-key encryption scheme). We are interested in studying the communication complexity (the cost of transmitting rekey messages) of protocols that fall within this class.
One simple way in which rekey operations can be handled is to have the center share individual long-lived secret keys with every user of the channel and, after any membership change, transmit a fresh group key encrypted under the individual keys of only the new set of members (as advocated in [20] and [19] ). This, however, is not a scalable solution since the amount of communication required for the rekey operation is linear in the size of the current group. The question is: how much better than the linear-cost solution can we do? The Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) approach (proposed by Wong et al. [36] and Wallner et al. [35] ) provides a framework for building protocols in which the average communication cost is reduced to logarithmic in the size of the group. The original LKH protocol [36] , [35] , which makes use of symmetric-key encryption as the only cryptographic primitive, requires the transmission of messages 1 each time a user leaves and another one joins the group, where is the size of the group. 2 Subsequent work [5] , [22] provides improvements over the original protocol, reducing the 1 By a "message," we refer to a fixed-size packet of sufficiently large size to allow for the transmission of a single (possibly encrypted) key or key share. 2 For simplicity, we consider groups of fixed size in analyzing protocols, that is, we assume that each time a user leaves, another one is immediately added.
Thus, the size of the group is always equal to n. We refer to each simultaneous execution of a leave and a join as a "group update operation" above. Section V provides a discussion on groups with separate leave and join operations.
1558-2566/$25.00 © 2008 IEEE number of transmissions to exactly messages per update. Although these solutions are exponentially more efficient than the linear-cost solution, it would be desirable to have protocols with even smaller communication complexity. We are interested in investigating whether this is possible or not using standard symmetric-key cryptography techniques.
A. Previous Lower Bounds
The inability to devise more communication-efficient protocols has prompted many researchers to attempt to prove lower bounds for multicast key distribution showing that no such improvement is indeed possible. The first nontrivial communication lower bound for the problem was proved by Canetti et al. in [6] . This bound applied to a restricted class of protocols, namely protocols where the group members have a bounded amount of memory, or the key distribution scheme has a special "structure-preserving" property (see [6] for details). A different, and seemingly optimal, lower bound for a more general class of protocols without memory or structure restrictions was later proven by Snoeyink et al. [32] , who showed that, in any secure multicast key distribution protocol (within a certain class), the group center can be forced to transmit at least rekey messages per group update (on the average). 3 Snoeyink et al. [32] also provide a simple variant of the original LKH protocol [36] , [35] that meets the established lower bound. (The variant essentially involves replacing binary trees with ternary ones.) This apparently closed the gap between upper and lower bounds for the problem, putting a final word to the search for an optimal solution.
It turns out, however, that, despite the close relationship between existing protocols and the lower bound proven in [32] , the class of protocols considered in that work falls short of accommodating all known protocols. In particular, the protocol model used in [32] mandates that the group center transmits rekey messages only of the form -a random key encrypted with another random key . More general protocols are indeed possible (as even mentioned in [32] ) and have also been considered in practice. Some standard, and eminently practical, techniques quite commonly used in cryptographic protocols (but not incorporated in the model of [32] ) are the following.
1) Nested encryption, where more than one encryption operations are applied in a sequence to the same message to create ciphertexts of the form . Nested encryption has been used in some existing multicast encryption protocols like those of [11] , [7] , and [12] ; 2) Pseudorandom generators (PRGs), which can be used to expand a single random key into multiple "seemingly random" ones. In principle, this allows to transmit multiple keys at the price of just one. (In order to transmit a set of pseudorandom keys each derived from a single key , the center needs to send just to the recipients.) Various multicast encryption protocols in the literature [5] , [29] , [12] make use of PRGs; 3) Secret sharing schemes, which can be used to "split" a single message into multiple shares, such that the original message can be recovered given only specific (pre-specified) subsets of the shares. Such schemes have been used 3 A similar but quantitatively weaker result was independently proven by Yang and Lam [38] .
in certain broadcast encryption protocols in the past (e.g., the protocol of [27] ). The inadequacy of the models used by previous lower bounds is clearly demonstrated by known protocols that "beat" the lower bound proved in [32] . For example, [5] uses a combination of symmetric-key encryption and PRGs to achieve a communication complexity of , which is strictly smaller than the bound proven in [32] . Another point of contention is the following. In [24] , we show that, if the group center is not allowed to use nested encryption in generating rekey messages (as in the protocol model of [6] and [32] ), then security of a protocol against single corrupt receivers is equivalent to its security against collusions of such receivers (that is, if such a protocol is proven secure in a setting in which malicious receivers do not collude, then it is also guaranteed to be collusion-resistant.) So, although not explicitly stated in [32] , the lower bound proven in that paper applies to protocols satisfying a weak notion of security that does not allow receiver collusions. Indeed, there exist protocols [12] , [7] that satisfy such a security notion and are able to achieve constant communication complexity by making use of nested encryption in the generation of rekey messages.
These observations highlight the limited applicability of the result of [32] , and take us back to our initial question. Can we design practical multicast encryption protocols (secure against collusions) with communication efficiency better than ?
B. Our Contribution
We resolve the above question (in the negative) for a large class of symmetric-key multicast encryption protocols, namely, protocols that make arbitrary blackbox usage of symmetric-key encryption, PRGs, and secret sharing schemes. We show that any protocol that uses these three primitives to generate the center's messages and achieves a reasonable level of security must incur a communication cost of at least (up to an additive subconstant term) per group update operation in the worst case.
More specifically, we exhibit an adversarial strategy for performing group update operations that forces the center in any secure multicast key distribution protocol to transmit at least messages per update on the average, with being the size of the group and a quantity that tends to 0 as the number of updates increases. The protocol model we use to prove this bound is fairly general and captures all known protocols for the problem. Furthermore, our lower bound is extremely tight in the sense that it matches the upper bound of [5] (the most communication-efficient protocol known) up to a subconstant, additive term. This can be interpreted as saying that the gain derived from using PRGs in [5] is just about the best possible and that even the use of iterated encryption and secret sharing schemes cannot substantially improve the communication complexity of their protocol.
The definition of security that we use in proving this lower bound parallels security notions used in most previous work on multicast encryption. In particular, we require that the group key at every instant be unrecoverable by the users outside the multicast group, even when these users collude in an attempt to recover it. We remark that our proof makes essential use of the full power of this definition, as illustrated by (insecure) protocols [12] , [7] with constant communication complexity that still tolerate individual corruption of users.
Our lower bound, like those of [6] and [32] is a worst-case lower bound for multicast encryption protocols, proven with respect to an adversarially chosen sequence of membership update operations. This is perhaps in contrast with the average-case performance analysis more commonly used when evaluating the performance of networking protocols. We remark that the use of worst-case analysis is standard in cryptography and security, and it is motivated by the fact that when a system is under attack, the assumptions underlying average-case analysis may not hold. For example, an adversary mounting an attack to a multicast key distribution protocol may let a set of corrupted users join and leave the group in a way that maximizes the success probability of the attack.
One last contribution of this work is the explicit use of a symbolic model of computation in the formulation and proof of our lower bound. (Previous lower bounds relied either on randomized models of ideal cryptography [6] or informal definitions [38] , [32] .) Symbolic security models were previously used in the design and analysis of secure multicast protocols. (See, for example [24] and references therein.) We show how a symbolic security model can be used both to precisely describe a large class of multicast encryption protocols and to give simple combinatorial proofs of lower bounds within it.
C. Organization
In Section II, we briefly review related work. Section III gives a detailed description of the model used to prove our lower bound. The lower bound is proved in Section IV. Section V concludes the paper with a discussion of possible extensions and open problems.
II. RELATED WORK As already mentioned, previous work on private communication in broadcast scenarios is based on two distinct formulations-broadcast encryption and multicast encryption. In the broadcast encryption model, introduced by Fiat and Naor [13] , a central authority (for example, a PayTV provider) broadcasts encrypted information to a set of low-end receiving devices, such that only a "legitimate" subset of these receivers are able to procure the transmitted information. The receivers that are not part of the legitimate subset are said to be revoked and the set of revoked receivers changes with time. An important feature of broadcast encryption is that receivers are assumed to be stateless, in the sense that at any instant, a legitimate receiver can decrypt any transmitted information using only a set of keys given to him at the beginning of the protocol (and without having to record the protocol history). Communication is typically one-way-from the broadcast station to all the receivers (although some recent protocols [9] are "public key" in nature and allow anyone to send information to the legitimate receivers). Also, the set of receivers is typically fixed a priori and in most systems it is not possible to add fresh receivers after protocol initialization.
Broadcast encryption schemes find application in several scenarios, the most important ones being secure PayTV networks and media content protection and have received a lot of attention from the cryptography and digital rights management (DRM) communities [13] , [2] , [14] , [15] , [26] , [18] , [17] , [8] , [4] . In general, broadcast encryption protocols tend to be less efficient than those for multicast encryption owing to the requirement of statelessness on the part of the receivers. A near-optimal combinatorial lower bound on the communication complexity of symmetric-key broadcast encryption protocols was given by Luby and Staddon [21] ; their bound, however, applies to protocols that use only symmetric-key encryption (without allowing for nesting) and is not tight even for this class of protocols [26] .
In this paper, we are concerned with multicast encryption, which is closely related to broadcast encryption but with some important differences. As in broadcast encryption, this problem relates to communicating secret information to a dynamic group of users (or devices). However, unlike broadcast encryption schemes, users in a multicast encryption protocol must remain online and update their internal states while they are part of the multicast group. At the same time, communication is not always from a central authority to a set of receivers: the users in the group themselves may broadcast messages directed to the other group members (imagine a private virtual room with dynamic membership). Also, the space of potential users of the channel can be extremely large (for example, all users on the Internet) and is not fixed a priori. This problem has been studied extensively in the computer networks and cryptography communities [36] , [35] , [25] , [6] , [5] , [30] , [38] , [12] , [22] , [32] . Most of the existing protocols for multicast encryption use a centralized architecture, wherein a single central authority is tasked with establishing a common shared key for all group members and users are assumed to share a unique secret key with this authority. (Such a key can be established during protocol setup using, say, public-key techniques.) This paper also deals with the centralized model of key distribution.
As in most previous work on multicast encryption, we use a model in which group key updates are performed by the protocol after every single leave or join operation (or a simultaneous execution of the two) takes place. We point out that some protocols in the literature [37] also allow "batched" key updates; in such protocols, the group key needs to be updated only once for multiple simultaneous leave and join operations. However, the efficiency benefits derived from batched rekeying are typically not very significant; for example, in the protocol of [37] , a key update for batches of size upto involves transmitting at least rekey messages per user, which is within a factor 2 of the lower bound we prove for single user leaves and joins.
A preliminary version of this paper appeared in [23] . Subsequent to [23] , a lower bound of for a problem similar to the one studied here was proven in [34] . The results in [34] are incomparable to ours. On the one hand, the lower bound proved in [34] applies to individual group update operations, while ours considers the amortized cost of a sequence of group updates. On the other hand, the results of [34] apply only to a very restricted class of multicast protocols (called key graph protocols in [34] ), even smaller than the class of protocols studied in previous lower bound papers [6] , [38] , [36] . Needless to say, it is easy to design practical protocols that beat the (nonamortized) lower bound on individual group update operations proved in [34] . In fact, amortizing over a sequence of update operations (as done in this paper) seem necessary to prove robust lower bounds: the communication cost associated with a specific group update operation can always be reduced by transmitting more messages in a previous step.
OTHER SECURITY CONCERNS IN MULTICAST. Besides secrecy, other important security issues in broadcast and multicast that have also been studied in the literature are authenticity (making sure that only authorized users can transmit messages and these messages are not altered during transmission [5] , [3] ), independence (emulating a synchronous network where all players transmit and receive messages at the same time [16] ), reliability (making key distribution protocols robust in the presence of packet losses [29] , [33] ) and availability (protecting the network against denial of service attacks). These are all different security concerns that can be addressed separately using appropriate cryptographic techniques. Here, we briefly discuss authenticity. As discussed in [5] , one can define two kinds of authenticity over broadcast channels. In some applications, one may want to authenticate whether the sender of some information to the multicast group is a group member or not. This kind of authentication is possible using efficient symmetric-key cryptography techniques and invoking any protocol for multicast key distribution. A more stringent notion is source authentication, that is, authenticating the exact identity of the sender (who could also be from outside the group). Protocols based on symmetric-key techniques (for example, [28] ) have also been proposed for source authentication in multicast but such protocols do not guarantee strong security (for example, the protocol of [28] is secure only under some synchronicity assumptions on the channel users). Indeed, the source authentication problem is closely tied to public-key digital signatures and it has been shown that coming up with efficient and secure source authentication protocols for multicast is essentially equivalent to designing efficient digital signature schemes [3] .
III. MODEL
Our lower bound on the communication complexity of multicast key distribution protocols is proved within a symbolic security model. What we mean by "symbolic" here is that cryptographic objects are treated as abstract data types in the model, and their constructors and destructors capture the security features offered by them. Such a model was initially proposed in [10] for analyzing security of encryption protocols against active attacks and is often referred to as the Dolev-Yao security model after the authors of [10] . The model we present is essentially a generalization of the Dolev-Yao model that incorporates various cryptographic primitives besides encryption.
A. Cryptographic Primitives Used
We consider security protocols that make use of messages created using symmetric-key cryptographic techniques. Our focus is on symmetric-key techniques since these are the most commonly used operations in practice due to their high efficiency in terms of both computation time and memory/bandwith usage. 4 The most common cryptographic operation used to achieve secrecy goals is encryption. An encryption function takes as input a key and a message and outputs a ciphertext , called the encryption of under . Informally, an encryption scheme is secure if hides the content of the message . The message can be recovered from the ciphertext (if and only if the encryption key is known) using the corresponding decryption operation (1) Another operation frequently used in conjunction with keyed cryptographic primitives (like encryption) is pseudorandom generation. A pseudorandom generator is a function that allows to expand a single key (called the seed) into a longer sequence of seemingly random and independent keys (2) We remark that the keys can be efficiently computed from , so any party that knows will also know . PRGs can be (and, in fact, have been) used to improve the communication efficiency of multicast encryption protocols as they allow to transmit multiple keys at the price of transmitting only the seed . From a security point of view, it is assumed that pseudorandom keys are as good as (formally, indistinguishable from) real ones. In particular, encryption schemes remain secure when used with pseudorandom keys instead of truly random ones.
One last cryptographic primitive we consider is secret sharing. A secret sharing scheme [31] allows to "split" a message into components (called shares) , for some fixed integer , such that the message can be recovered only from certain subsets of the shares. These special subsets are defined using an access structure . For every subset , if we are given the set of shares of some message , then we can efficiently recover using a reconstruction function as
A typical example is the " out of " secret sharing scheme where the access structure is the set of all subsets of of size at least , that is, the secret can be reconstructed if and only if at least shares are known. The efficiency of secret sharing schemes makes them excellent tools to be used in conjunction with symmetric-key encryption and pseudorandom generators. (For example, " out of " sharing, which is a special case of " out of " sharing, can be implemented using only the operation.) In this paper, we consider secret sharing schemes with arbitrary access structure .
B. Symbolic Security Model
We consider security protocols where messages are created using arbitrary nested combination of encryption, pseudorandom generators and secret sharing schemes. Formally, messages are described by expressions derived from the following grammar:
where the variables and represent messages and keys and is a variable that ranges over a (potentially infinite) set of truly random keys . Examples of messages generated by our grammar are:
• -the encryption of pseudorandom key under key ; • -the double encryption of random key under pseudorandom keys and ; • -the double encryption of the key share under and . A few remarks regarding our model are in order.
• For simplicity, we have assumed that the stretch factor of the pseudorandom generator equals . (Such PRGs are called "length-doubling".) This is without loss of generality because PRGs with larger stretch factors can be easily built from length-doubling ones using standard chaining techniques [39] , [1] . • Although our grammar allows ciphertexts to be created using arbitrary, nested applications of the encryption function, it does not permit the use of ciphertexts either as encryption keys or as seeds to the pseudorandom generator. Using ciphertexts to play the role of keys is injudicious cryptographic practice since, in general, they do not have the pseudorandomness properties that keys are required to possess. 5 No security protocol that we are aware of uses ciphertexts in this manner.
• Our grammar enables shares to be created by applying the sharing function iteratively on both keys and ciphertexts. Shares can themselves be encrypted under multiple keys but cannot be used to encrypt other messages or to generate pseudorandom keys. Although we restrict shares from being used in this manner, we remark that our lower bound also applies to protocols that do use shares for encryption and pseudorandom generation. We focus on thea above class of protocols mainly for simplicity of exposition. 6 • All functions and in our grammar have the property that (when implemented) they produce outputs of length at least as big as (but usually comparable to) their input values. In particular, we can regard all messages as having approximately the same length, and measure the communication complexity of a protocol as the number of messages transmitted, regardless of the structure of the messages. Messages as defined by the above grammar are purely syntactic objects. The intended meaning of the expressions and the syntactic operations employed in their construction is described by an entailment relation specifying what information can be recovered given a set of messages . The entailment relation is defined inductively by the following rules:
The first rule is obvious: every message in can be recovered from . The other three rules correspond to the correctness conditions (1), (2) , and (3) associated with the three cryptographic primitives. For example, if and , 5 For example, given any (provably secure) encryption function, E, it is possible to design another (provably secure) encryption function E , such that one can easily recover a message M from a corresponding ciphertext E (M ) without knowing either K or M . As a trivial example, consider this. Let K [1 1 1n] denote the first n bits of key K and define
If we choose a sufficiently large value for n (e.g., polynomial in the security parameter), then provable security of E (under the standard notion of indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attacks) implies the same for E . However, E (M ) is almost always equal to M. 6 For a protocol that uses shares for encryption or pseudorandom generation to be provably secure, the sharing scheme must be implemented in a manner that guarantees pseudorandomness of all shares. (This need not be true for every implementation of the scheme.) then we can recover from using the following sequence of operations:
The last step in this derivation process holds because we assumed to be a part of the access structure . For any , the set of messages that can be recovered from using is denoted .
C. Secure Multicast Key Distribution
Let denote a set of users having access to a reliable and authenticated broadcast channel, with being a large (potentially infinite) value. A multicast key distribution protocol for users has two components: a setup program , and a key distribution program . The setup program assigns long-lived keys to all users and decides the initial state of the program . For all , the long-lived key of user , denoted , is an arbitrary random or pseudorandom key [that is, an arbitrary expression derived from in grammar expression (4)], subject to the requirement that it is not derivable from any other long-lived key. In other words, there must exist no two keys such that for some bits and . This condition guarantees that long-lived keys are computationally indistinguishable from independent truly random keys, and is essential for the security of the protocol.
The program models the behavior of the group key distribution authority. For every instant , it takes a set (the set of members at time ) and outputs a set of messages (while also updating its state internally). The output messages, called rekey messages, are used to establish a shared secret key among all members at time . Each message is derived from the variable in our grammar. The set of members and non-members changes with time and these changes are determined by an adversarial entity, . At every instant issues one of three types of commands: • : set ; • : set ; • : set also decides the initial membership of the group, . For any instant , the set of non-members at that instant (that is, the set ) is denoted . For any sequence of sets determined by such an adversary, let denote the union of all rekey messages output by when given (in that order) as input. We measure the communication complexity of the protocol by amortizing over such sequences of membership updates. Namely, the communication cost incurred by the protocol when run on input is equal to . This is expressed in terms of the maximum number of members at any point during this execution. (In fact, as we will see, in our lower bound analysis, the adversary always keeps the number of members equal to the initial size of the group .)
Definition (Security):
A multicast key distribution protocol is secure if for all , and all sequences determined by the adversary, there exists a key (called the group key at time ) such that the following conditions hold.
• Each member at time can recover , that is,
• Nonmembers at time cannot recover even by colluding, that is, The above definition of security says that nonmembers should not be able to obtain the group key at any instant based only on the information obtained at or before that instant. This kind of security is often referred to as forward secrecy [32] . To strengthen the security definition, one can also require backward secrecy-the group key at any instant should not be computable by a non-member even after that instant (which implies, in particular, that new entrants to the group cannot compute past group keys). However, using a weak definition of security only makes our results stronger: Our goal here is to prove a lower bound and proving a lower bound on protocols that satisfy the above (weaker) definition immediately implies that the same bound holds for more secure protocols.
Another important remark is the following. Since most networking protocols do not provide any form of security, it is a good practice to assume that an adversary attacking the network has access to all transmitted data, which needs to be properly protected using appropriate cryptographic techniques. Moreover, this allows for the development of security solutions that are independent of the underlying networking technology. In the above definition, the criterion models the fact that the adversary has complete knowledge of all past communication. The assumption of infinite memory is less reasonable in the case of group members in our correctness criterion , because we would like legitimate group members to be able to determine the group key given only the information transmitted since the moment they joined the group. However, giving all past rekey messages to every user makes our security definition less stringent, which, as already discussed, only strengthens our lower bound.
IV. LOWER BOUND
Let be any secure multicast key distribution protocol and consider an execution of the protocol upto time , given an arbitrary sequence of member sets, , as input. For any such execution, the keys used in the protocol can be partitioned into two classes-those that are recoverable by nonmembers at time and those that are not. Usefulness is a dynamic concept: keys and messages that are useful at one instant may be useless at another instant. Every time a member is removed from the multicast group (that is, is made a nonmember), all useful keys known to that member (in particular, the group key) turn useless, and, as a result, all messages encapsulating these keys that were transmitted in the past also become useless. Our goal in this paper is to design an adversarial strategy for performing group updates in such a way that for every update involving the removal of a member, "sufficiently" many protocol transmissions become useless. Specifically, we show how the adversary can execute a sequence of replace operations such that, for every operation in this sequence, at least logarithmically many useful rekey messages (sent upto that point of time) become useless. Such messages may have been sent at any time in the past (and not necessarily at the moment when the replaced member joined the group) but the protocol must incur a communication cost of one for each such message. Thus, in order to maintain the security constraint, the protocol must, on the average, incur a logarithmic communication cost for every membership update.
A. Combinatorial Interpretation
For the proof, we interpret keys and messages using graphtheoretic terminology. With every execution of protocol for a sequence of sets , we associate a directed graph called the key graph at that time. Every vertex in this graph models a useful key at time and paths between vertices abstract the process of key recovery (defined by the entailment relation ) starting from a single useful key. We introduce edges in the graph in a manner that ensures that for every two (useful) keys , if is recoverable from at time (that is, ), then there exists a path from to in . For example, for any two keys and such that , we introduce an edge in . Similarly, if the message was sent by the protocol at or before time (that is, if ), then the graph contains the edge . More generally, if the messages were sent at or before time ( all being useful), then the graph contains the path . How do we extend this idea to the case of arbitrarily nested messages? Recall, that in our model, every key can be encrypted more than once, using different encryption keys, in the same rekey message and the sharing operation can also be applied to various intermediate ciphertexts in an arbitrarily nested manner. Messages can be mapped to edges in several different ways, and the proof of our lower bound relies on a careful choice of this mapping. For every message encapsulating a key , we pick a single useful key (if there is such a key) under which is encrypted in , and create an edge from to . If is encrypted in under multiple useful keys, then we select as the key of the inner-most encryption operation. For example, a rekey message of the form , where are all useful, gets mapped to the edge (and not ) since is the inner-most useful encryption key in it. The same is the case for the messages, and , and if and are useless keys (for time ), then also for . Note that according to this convention, a rekey message in which there are no encryption keys or one in which all encryption keys are useless (for the given instant) is not represented in the key graph; for example, messages of the form and , with being useless at time , do not map to any edge in . Such a representation of messages may appear too parsimonious at first glance (for example, protocol messages comprising a key share are not depicted in at all, even if the corresponding key is useful at time ) but, as we will see, it suffices for proving our lower bound. A formal definition of is given below. Definition 4: Let be a secure multicast key distribution protocol executed with a sequence of membership update operations . The key graph for the protocol at time is a directed graph where and is the set of all ordered pairs such that at least one of the following is true.
1) There exists such that . 2) There exists such that (for arbitrary sequences of encryption and sharing operations ) and for all is not contained in . The edges in that satisfy condition 2) above are called communication edges, or -edges, since they correspond to at least one rekey message transmitted by the protocol upto time . The map from useful rekey messages to -edges is a partial function-every useful message sent at or before time corresponds to zero or one (but not more than one) -edges in . Edges other than communication edges are referred to as given edges, or -edges, since they correspond to PRG computations that can be performed without incurring any communication cost.
For any key graph and a key in it, let denote the indegree of key in . An important property of key graphs is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 1: The number of communication edges ( -edges) incident upon any node in a key graph is at least . Proof: The semantics of our symbolic security model dictates that every key used in the protocol be obtainable from a unique seed, and using a unique sequence of zero or more PRG computations. In the context of key graphs, this has the implication that every key in a key graph must have at most one -edge incident upon it. (Purely random keys have no -edge incident upon them while pseudorandom ones have one -edge per key.) The proposition follows from this. and P (t) share a common edge k ! k(t).
The following lemma characterizes how reachability in key graphs corresponds to our notion of key recovery.
Lemma 1: For any secure multicast key distribution protocol , for every , for every sequence of membership updates performed by the adversary, and for every pair of keys , if , then there exists a path from to in such that for every key on this path, . We defer the proof of this lemma to Section IV-C and first show how we use it in proving the lower bound.
Since the group key and the long-lived keys of members are useful at time , they must all be vertices in the key graph for that time. Furthermore, must be recoverable from the long-lived key of each member and the set . From the lemma, then, it follows that for every , and every , there exists a path from to in and each key on this path is known to member (that is, ). For every such and , we pick an arbitrary path satisfying this criterion and denote it as . We will henceforth focus on the sub-graph of every key graph consisting only of (the union of) these paths, that is, paths from member long-lived keys to the group key.
Definition 5: For any secure multicast key distribution protocol , executed with a sequence of membership updates , the member key graph at time , denoted , is the subgraph of such that an edge is in if and only if it is contained in the path (from to the group key ) for some . Note that for any such that , the key must not lie on the path since otherwise it would be recoverable by member , and, as a result, the protocol would be insecure. (For example, if was on the path , then the adversary could remove from the group at time and then any group key known to , in particular , would be known to as well.) This means that, for all , the node has no edges incident upon it in the member key graph ; that is, . Fig. 1 shows an example member key graph for three members and their corresponding paths and .
B. Adversarial Strategy
We are now ready to describe the adversarial strategy that we use to prove our lower bound. A first attempt at defining such a strategy would be to have the adversary consider the member key graph at time and to have him replace the member for whom the group key is furthest from the key in this graph, that is, for whom the length of the path is maximum. Since the removal of causes all keys known to (in particular, those that lie on ) to become useless, one would hope that such a strategy guarantees the above requirement. This, however, is not always the case. For example, consider the member key graph shown in Fig. 1 . Here, is the longest amongst all paths between a member long-lived key and the group key, but, by removing , the adversary would make only one useful message, namely the one corresponding to the edge , useless. On the other hand, removing member is more beneficial for him since it leads to three such messages becoming useless.
This example illustrates that one needs to be a bit more careful in picking the member to replace at every step. A good adversarial strategy should involve considering, for every current member , the total number of -edges that are incident upon keys in (rather than just the length of ) and replacing the member for which this number is the largest. According to Proposition 1, the number of -edges incident upon a single node in a key graph is no less than the in-degree of the node minus one. Thus, the total number of -edges incident upon a path can be no less than the sum of the in-degrees of all nodes on the path, minus the number of nodes in . We formalize this idea using the following definition.
Definition 6: Let be a directed graph and let be a path in that starts from a node . The in-degree of in , denoted , is the number of edges in starting from a node not in and incident upon one that is in , that is
In the special case that is a member key graph and for some , the node has in-degree zero and the in-degree of simply equals . From proposition 1, it then follows that the in-degree of bounds from below the total number of -edges incident upon nodes in it.
Our adversarial strategy can now be formulated in terms of in-degrees of paths. The adversary starts off by setting to be an arbitrary subset of of size . At each instant , he inspects the member key graph , sets to be the member label for which is maximum, sets to be any non-member label such that was not a member before time , and executes the command . The procedure is repeated for all instants . The strategy involves only REPLACE operations, and so the size of the group remains fixed at throughout the execution of the protocol. We now argue that replacing members in this manner guarantees that at each instant in the protocol, the number of useful messages that become useless is at least . This is proven using the following lemma on the in-degree of paths in graphs. (The proof of the lemma is postponed to Section IV-D.)
Lemma 2: Let be an arbitrary graph and let be any set of nodes in the graph such that for each , there exists a path from to and there exists no such that occurs in . Then, there exists an such that
In the setting of member key graphs, the 's in the above lemma correspond to the long-lived keys of the current members, and each path goes from the key to the current group key . Recall that member key graphs have the property that no member long-lived key lies on the path for . Thus, from the above lemma, it follows that, for every , the member replaced by our adversary at time is such that the path in the member key graph at time has in-degree at least . As already discussed, the in-degree of a path in a member key graph bounds, from below, the number of -edges incident upon keys on that path. So, at every instant , the adversary effectively removes a member for whom the number of -edges incident upon nodes in is at least . Once member is removed, all useful keys known to become useless, and thus all messages encapsulating such keys become useless as well. This, in particular, includes the messages corresponding to the -edges incident upon nodes in , which, by definition, were useful till time . Note that the number of such useful messages must at least be equal to the number of -edges incident upon nodes in itself. Therefore, under the above adversarial strategy, at least useful messages must turn useless at time . Also, since is never added back to the group by the adversary, these messages must remain useless for all instants after .
The total number of rekey messages communicated by the protocol upto time is at least equal to the sum of useful messages sent upto that time, which, we know from above, is at least . Thus, the communication cost incurred by the protocol upto time , must be at least , which is asymptotically the same as . We summarize our result in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: There exists an adversary strategy consisting only of REPLACE commands such that for any secure multicast key distribution protocol , the amortized communication cost incurred by the protocol when executed against that strategy, is at least . Thus, the asymptotic communication cost of every protocol against this strategy is at least .
C. Proof of Lemma 1
Let and be any two keys satisfying the conditions in the statement of the lemma, that is, both of the keys are useful (at time ) and can be recovered from the set of expressions . Let be the smallest number of applications of the entailment operation required to derive from . For example, if , then ; if but there exists a key such that , then ; and so on. In the sequel, we refer to every application of towards the derivation of as a "step" in the derivation process.
We will prove the lemma using induction over . Namely, we will show, inductively, that, for all and for every useful key recoverable from in steps, there exists a path from to in . The statement is true for since in this case must be equal to (for if , then it would be useless) and so there is a trivial path from to . Suppose that the statement is true for all values of smaller than a number . That is, for all , every useful key recoverable from in steps has a path leading to itself from in and all keys along the path are in . Consider any useful key recoverable from in steps. Two possibilities arise. 1) There exists a key such that for some and is recoverable from in steps. For to be useful at time , the same must be true for . From the inductive hypothesis, it follows that there exists a path from to in and joining this path with the -edge gives us the desired path from to . 2) There exist a set of rekey messages , each message encapsulating , such that the set of encryption keys in all these messages is recoverable from in less than steps and . In this case, we first observe that at least one of the keys in must be useful. (If all of was useless, that is, if was contained in , then , which is in would also be contained in . This would mean is useless-which is a contradiction!) Thus, there must exist at least one message that encapsulates and contains a useful encryption key , with being: 1) the inner-most useful encryption key in and 2) recoverable from in less than steps. Again, from our hypothesis, it follows that there exists a path from to in and we join this path with the -edge to get a path from to .
D. Proof of Lemma 2
Our proof of this lemma, again, involves an inductive argument. We perform induction over , and show that, for all , all subsets of and all sets of paths satisfying the conditions in the lemma, there exists an such that . We treat paths as sequences of nodes and for any two paths and denotes the path (that is, the sequence of nodes) formed by concatenating and . For , the lemma is trivially true. The path from to , is the only path under consideration and it has in-degree equal to . We hypothesize that, for all values of less than some , the statement of the lemma is true, that is, for all , all sets of nodes and all sets of paths such that for all : 1) is a path from to and 2) does not lie on for any , we can find an such that . Consider any subset of , such that there exist paths , each path going from to and no lying on for . Without loss of generality, we assume that all these paths are loop-free. (The existence of a path with loops implies the existence of one without loops between the same two nodes.) Let be the largest common suffix of ; that is, is the longest path such that for each , there exists a path for which . Let be the first node in . Since we assumed the 's to be loop-free, there is exactly one path for each such that . We partition the set based on the last node on these paths; that is, for each set in this partition, the last node on each of the 's in , is the same, say . Let be the size of this partition. (Note that, by the maximality of the suffix must be at least 2.) Corresponding to the partition of the 's, the nodes can also be partitioned into sets. Let be these sets. Fig. 2 shows an example with . Since the total number of vertices in put together is , there must exist some such that has a size at least . Let be the graph formed by taking the union of the 's corresponding to such a . The set of paths has the property that: 1) each is a path from to and 2) no lies on a path for . From the inductive hypothesis, then, there must exist an index such that is at least . Now, the in-degree of path is at least equal to the sum of the in-degree of and . (This is because lies on but not on .) This sum can be bounded from below as
The last inequality holds because, for all integers .
V. CONCLUSION In this paper, we have proven a tight lower bound for the problem of multicast encryption that applies to a fairly large class of protocols, encompassing, in particular, all protocols currently known in the literature. Our bound shows that even by exploiting sophisticated cryptographic techniques like nested encryption, pseudorandom keys and secret sharing, it is not possible to go below the barrier in the communication complexity of these protocols. Our lower bound is essentially optimal, matching known upper bounds up to small subconstant additive terms.
The lower bound is proved within a generic model of computation where cryptographic operations are treated symbolically. While symbolic models like the one used in this paper have been widely used for the analysis of cryptographic protocols, to the best of our knowledge they had never been explicitly used before to formulate and prove negative results, like lower bounds on the efficiency of secure protocols. We consider our use of symbolic models for the proof of lower bounds an important contribution of our work and believe that similar symbolic models can be useful to prove lower bounds or impossibility results for other classes of protocols as well. We conclude the paper discussing some potential variations of and extensions to our model. MESSAGE CONCATENATION. Symbolic security models as the one used in this paper typically include a rule (within the grammar defining the message space) that allows to concatenate messages together. Our lower bound immediately extends to such more general grammars, provided the communication complexity is appropriately defined, that is, instead of counting the number of messages sent by the group center, we consider the total size of the messages.
GROUPS WITHOUT SIMULTANEOUS LEAVE AND JOIN. The proof of our lower bound involves defining a sequence of adversarially-chosen REPLACE operations (simultaneous execution of a LEAVE and JOIN) and showing that every protocol must incur an average communication cost of for such a sequence. Having REPLACE operations as part of the model considerably simplifies the entire analysis by helping us keep the group size constant over time. However, in a situation where such an operation is not allowed, the bound that we get using our technique is (which is tight upto a "multiplicative" factor of 2). We remark that it is possible to construct (using ideas from [5] ) a protocol secure according to definition 1, in which every individual LEAVE can be performed for a cost of multicast messages and every individual JOIN for unicast messages. This implies an average cost of multicast and unicast per update operation (which meets our lower bound if we ignore the unicast overhead). An interesting question is whether our bound can be extended so that it is tight even when the unicast cost is included in computing communication complexity or whether one can come up with better protocols that involve no unicast at all.
INCORPORATING PSEUDORANDOM FUNCTIONS. It would be interesting to extend our model even further to incorporate the use of other cryptographic primitives, like pseudorandom functions (PRFs), in generating rekey messages, and to study multicast key distribution in such a model. Our belief is that an extension with PRFs will not affect our lower bound (that is, the communication complexity cannot be improved beyond ) but it is still worthwhile trying to investigate the possibility of better and more efficient protocols using other primitives. 7 
